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Abstract
Estimates of party ideological positions in Western Democracies yield useful
party-level information, but lack the ability to provide insight into intraparty pol-
itics. In this paper, we generate comparable measures of latent individual policy
positions from elite survey data which enable analysis of elite-level party ideology
and heterogeneity. This approach has advantages over both expert surveys and ap-
proaches based on behavioral data, such as roll call voting and is directly relevant
to the study of party cohesion. We generate a measure of elite positions for several
European countries using a common space scaling approach and demonstrate its
validity as a measure of party ideology. We then apply these data to determine
the sources of party heterogeneity, focusing on the role of intraparty competition in
electoral systems, nomination rules, and party goals. We find that policy-seeking
parties and centralized party nomination rules reduce party heterogeneity. While
intraparty competition has no effect, the presence of these electoral rules conditions
the effect of district magnitude.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a measurement approach to politicians’ policy positions from elite
survey data with an application to the study of party heterogeneity. Estimating the policy
positions of parties and politicians is key to understanding electoral competition, voter-
elite linkages, and coalition politics. Thus, methods have emerged focused on capturing
the positions of parties as electoral entities. In particular, scholars have developed expert
surveys (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Laver and Benoit, 2006;
Bakker, Edwards, Jolly, Polk, Rovny and Steenbergen, 2014; Bakker et al., 2015) and
analyses of party manifestos (Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987; Klingemann, Hofferbert
and Budge, 1994; Budge, 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Volkens et al., 2013) to compare
party ideological positions across time and across countries. The information derived
from these approaches is aggregated by party and only loosely related to the preferences
of actual party members. These measures allow no direct insight into the policy views
among party members.
Yet, numerous studies have drawn attention to the importance of elite intraparty
heterogeneity (Hazan, 2006, 2003; McGann, 2002; O¨zbudun, 1970; Giannetti and Benoit,
2008; Bowler et al., 1999; Owens, 2003), for example within coalition government (Laver
and Shepsle, 1990; Ba¨ck, 2008; Ba¨ck, Debus and Mu¨ller, 2016; Kam et al., 2010; Giannetti
and Benoit, 2008). The concept of party cohesion—preference similarity, distinct than
behavioral unity (Depauw and Martin, 2009; Depauw, 1999; Carey, 2008), is directly
important to the nature of democratic representation. If candidates represent a wide
range of policy views, the concept of programmatic party representation is weakened
(Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Giannetti and Benoit, 2008).
The literature has envisioned a number of reasons why party cohesion may vary. The
incentives and ability for parties to attract more diverse candidate pools are said to vary
with personal vote incentives, nomination procedures, and party goals. Yet, we lack ap-
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propriate tools to address such questions directly. Manifesto analysis and expert surveys
are useful for capturing a party’s overall position, but not the positions of party members.
Meanwhile, behavioral measures focused on individuals, such as roll-call analysis, are not
useful for uncovering individual policy preferences in many contexts, especially parlia-
ments where party-line voting is nearly universal (Carroll and Poole, 2014; Spirling and
McLean, 2007). While analysis of speech or co-sponsorship can provide useful informa-
tion on the preferences of elected party members in some cases (Slapin and Proksch, 2008;
Alema´n et al., 2009; Ba¨ck and Debus, 2016), such measures are not directly comparable
across countries.
As an alternative, this study describes and compares the ideological positions and
heterogeneity of parties by applying scaling techniques to issue questions in elite surveys.
We use a scaling method designed precisely for this type of data, blackbox (Poole, 1998;
Poole et al., 2015), to estimate individual ideological positions and then derive measures
of overall party positions and party ideological homogeneity. Using this approach to
capture elite ideology has several advantages. First, these estimated policy positions
stem directly from individual candidate responses to policy questions, better reflecting
policy preferences than behavioral measures. Second, these data are more comparable
across contexts than other forms of data derived from individual politicians, enabling
the cross-national analysis of party policy positions and intraparty politics. Third, these
data reflect the preferences of the elites within parties, a distinct concept from voter
or expert perceptions and campaign positioning. Such measures are important in order
to directly assess questions such as party heterogeneity using the intraparty variance of
our measure. While electoral systems and party organizational factors are often thought
to affect intraparty elite ideological heterogeneity, this measure allows us to test these
propositions.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we present an overview of methods for measuring
party preferences. Then we discuss scaling as a means to derive latent ideological mea-
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sures from the multiple issue scales in the European nations covered in the Comparative
Candidate Survey (CCS) as a source of such data. We then present several descriptive il-
lustrations of these measures and examine their face validity. In the final section, we apply
this method of survey data analysis to explore the relationship between party ideological
heterogeneity and variables related to electoral systems, party nomination practices and
party types. We find that intraparty competition does not directly impact party ideolog-
ical heterogeneity but mediates the effect of district magnitude in a manner consistent
with the arguments of Carey and Shugart (1995): in countries without intraparty compe-
tition, lower district magnitudes increase heterogeneity; yet, the relationship is reversed
when intraparty competition is present. Further, we find that candidate selection at the
national level increases cohesion and that parties that prioritize their policy positions tend
to recruit a more homogeneous pool of candidates.
2 Background
2.1 Estimating party policy positions
To date, most researchers measuring elite preferences in parliamentary regimes have fo-
cused on party-level measures such as manifesto analysis, voters’ placements, and ex-
perts’ judgments (Laver, 2014). Manifesto analysis focuses on parties’ political messages
to voters, estimating party policy positions from a content analysis of election manifestos
(Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987; Budge, 2001; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge,
1994; Klingemann et al., 2006; Volkens et al., 2013). While this method has some weak-
nesses (Budge, 2000; Volkens, 2007; Mikhaylov, Laver and Benoit, 2012), it provides use-
ful estimates of how parties present themselves in a cross-nationally comparable fashion
(Budge and McDonald, 2007; Ko¨nig, Marbach and Osnabru¨gge, 2013). Voters’ percep-
tions of left-right party positions from mass surveys can also be useful for understanding
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the ideology of parties (Dow, 2001; Blais and Bodet, 2006; Dalton, 2008; Ezrow, 2008;
Dow, 2011) and in some cases it is possible to cross-nationally compare these ideological
placements (Lo, Proksch and Gschwend, 2014; Saiegh, 2015). A third approach, expert
surveys on party positions, also has provided highly useful data on the overall tenden-
cies of parties (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Laver and Benoit, 2006; Benoit and Laver, 2007;
Hooghe et al., 2010; Marks et al., 2007; Bakker, Jolly and Polk, 2012; Wiesehomeier and
Benoit, 2009; Bakker et al., 2015) with cross-national comparability (Bakker, Edwards,
Jolly, Polk, Rovny and Steenbergen, 2014; Bakker, Jolly, Polk and Poole, 2014).
However, while these approaches provide party-level estimates useful for many pur-
poses, there are key limitations. First, they pertain to aspects of parties other than the
preferences of their actual elite membership. Although politicians influence platforms
and the party reputation perceived by experts and voters, these are also influenced by a
large range of other factors. If we are interested in whether members of a party—that
is, members seeking legislative office—differ from each other or those in other parties,
these measures cannot directly capture this. Second, while each measure contains ways
to account for uncertainty about party locations—e.g. using the variance across expert
respondents (Rovny, 2012) or variance in manifesto scores (Jahn and Oberst, 2012), this
is separate from the question of whether the party membership is ideologically cohesive.
That is, these measures do not allow insight into the relationship between individual
politicians and their party. Understanding internal ideological features of parties, such as
heterogeneity, requires a measure focused directly on politicians themselves.
2.2 Understanding intraparty politics using individual policy
positions
One common method to estimate individual legislators’ policy positions is roll call anal-
ysis (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004; Poole, 2005), especially in the study of the US
6
Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Poole, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal, 2011) and other
presidential democracies (Morgenstern, 2003; Desposato, 2005, 2006). Of course, roll call
records are typically not useful for measuring individual preferences in parliamentary sys-
tems, where party discipline ensures high party unity in voting (Sieberer, 2006; Spirling
and McLean, 2007). Moreover, substantial variation in the selectivity of votes (Carrubba
et al., 2006; Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008; Carey, 2008) adds further limits to the va-
lidity and comparability of these data as a measure of preferences. While the use of speech
patterns in legislatures has considerable value for analyzing intraparty politics (Proksch
and Slapin, 2014; Ba¨ck and Debus, 2016), this comes without direct comparability across
chambers.
We focus here on the value of elite surveys as an alternative source for analyzing
party policy preferences and intraparty heterogeneity. Since elite surveys capture indi-
vidual politicians’ perceptions, researchers in American and comparative politics have
sometimes used these to examine legislators’ attitudes behind their behavior, often to
contrast legislative voting behavior to measures derived from elite surveys (Ansolabehere,
Snyder Jr and Stewart III, 2001; Kam, 2001; Coleman Battista and Richman, 2011).
In legislative studies, elite surveys are most commonly used for research related to roles
and representation (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008; Kam et al., 2010; Scully, Hix and Farrell,
2012; Andre´, Depauw and Martin, 2014; Deschouwer and Depauw, 2014; Bailer, 2014).
However, little comparative work has exploited the potential of elite surveys as a source
to obtain comparable latent ideological information.1 Estimating party and individual
politicians’ positions from elite surveys has several advantages. First, elite surveys allow
insight into the internal politics of parties—how the ideological positions of party members
relate to one another and to overall party positions. Second, unlike behavioral measures,
the resulting ideological information stems directly from politicians’ policy preferences,
free from strategic considerations and party discipline. Further, estimating ideology as a
1Saiegh’s work on Latin American countries (2009; 2015) is an important exception.
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latent property based on issue perceptions allows greater comparability than questions of
self-reported ideological labels due to the ability to link the latent ideological dimension
across countries. As a result, applying this “joint scaling” method to issue scale questions
can provide an elite ideological “common space” across several countries with which we
can compare party positions and heterogeneity.2
3 Survey data analysis for intraparty politics
3.1 Blackbox scaling
We use a scaling technique to uncover the basic policy space contained within the issue
scales of elite survey data (Poole, 1998; Saiegh, 2009; Poole et al., 2013; Armstrong et al.,
2014; Poole et al., 2015). Blackbox scaling has in common with roll-call scaling analy-
sis, such as those developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Clinton, Jackman and
Rivers (2004), the aim to uncover latent dimensions of data. These methods improved
on traditional multi-dimensional scaling by enabling a direct and precise estimation of
’ideal points’ using an iterative process of maximizing the fit of binary choice models,
rather than simply uncovering the main dimensions of a covariance matrix. Poole (1998)
developed the blackbox scaling procedure specifically to estimate ideal points on the main
latent dimensions of variance present in a series of issues scale questions (Armstrong et al.,
2014; Poole et al., 2013, 2015). Furthermore, as the method is robust to the presence of
missing data, data from common questions in multiple surveys can be used to generate
a ‘common space’. That is, by applying this method to the policy issue questions that
are shared across the surveys, we can recover a common ideological space among the
2Of course, there still may exist Differential Item Functioning (DIF) effects even on the most straight-
forward of issue questions and even when aggregating across issues. This is impossible to address with
any current data available. However, we believe these issues are mitigated by the tendency for elites from
the European region to have a common understanding of basic issue concepts at hand. Certainly this
problem should be less severe than the distortions we would expect from questions involving abstract
concepts such as “left” and “right” labels.
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respondents, similar to .
Blackbox scaling takes as its input a matrix of issue scale data from surveys. We begin
with a data matrix of survey data xij, where be the ith individual respondent’s (i = 1,. . . ,
n) reported policy position on the jth issue (j = 1,. . . , q) in each cell. Furthermore, let X0
be the n by q matrix of survey data. This survey data matrix is decomposed to individual
respondents’ true coordinates (Ψ) multiplied by weights that map the positions to the
basic space (W ), a intercept term (c), and an error term (E0) as follows:
X0 = [ΨW
′ + JNc′]0 + E0
Let Ψik be the ith individual’s position on the kth (k = 1,. . . , d)) basic dimension
with the number of basic dimensions d less than the number of survey issues q. The
coordinates of individual respondents are obtained by solving this equation. 3
3.2 The Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS)
We use the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS), which contains candidate surveys
across Europe as our source to recover ideological information.4 This dataset is designed
to analyze candidates running in a number of national parliamentary elections using a
common format. Since our concern here is to determine comparable latent ideological
dimensions, we are only able to make use of the 14 common survey questions on policy
issues (Table 1) in 13 countries (Table 2).The CCS data set contains 17,922 respondents
in 24 elections in 19 countries. Given our concerns for comparability here, we are only
able to make use of 8,130 respondents in the following 13 election surveys: Australia
2007, Austria 2008, Belgium 2007, Denmark 2011, Finland 2011, Germany 2009, Greece
3It is also possible to generate standard errors for each individual ideal point using the parametric
bootstrap, as described in Poole et al. (2015). Although we make use of the scores in the aggregate here,
it is possible to test the differences between individual members using the uncertainty of the estimation.
4http://www.comparativecandidates.org/
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2007, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, Netherlands 2006, Norway 2009, Portugal 2011, Sweden
2010. In these 13 election surveys, the 14 policy questions can be jointly scaled to develop
comparable measures cross-nationally. 5
In this sample, the response rates of the candidate surveys range from 22.3% (Portugal
in 2011) to 66.7% (Iceland in 2009). The resulting number of respondents is nevertheless
at least 169 (Netherlands in 2006). A list of information about the surveys is provided
in Table 2.6 Although we have taken measures to retain the most high quality data,
ultimately the importance of the response rate in undermining the utility of the surveys
depends on whether there is a significant distortion due to bias in the responses. In the
following section we focus on establishing the face validity of the resulting data. 7
We recover ideal points for 8,130 respondents in the 13 elections (country-years). In
our scaling, the first dimension is correlated with the overall left-right (mostly economic)
issues and the second dimension of the scaled data is driven mostly by certain moral
issues. The eigenvalues of these data indicates the 1st dimension explains about 41.77
percent of the variation and the 2nd dimension explains only about 11.72 percent of the
variation. In terms of the content of the two dimensions, the first dimension is most
strongly correlated with attitudes toward income and wealth redistribution and military
activity against terrorism. The first dimension is also driven somewhat by the questions
on immigrants adjusting to local customs and stiffer sentences for criminals. Thus, the
5We cannot make use of 11 out of 24 CCS election surveys for several reasons. First, due to lacking
most or all parts of these 14 comparable questions, we are unable to use the following 7 election surveys
from the CCS: Australia 2010, Canada 2008, Estonia 2011, Finland 2007, Germany 2005, Hungary 2010,
and Romania 2012. Second, Switzerland is not included to keep consistency in the parliamentary regime
type for our comparison and because the extremely large number of candidates.
6We also exclude 2 election surveys (Czech Republic 2006 and Portugal 2009) because the respondent
rates in the two election surveys are very low, below 20%. The precise response rates in Belgium 2007 and
Germany 2009 are not available. However, we were able to estimate an approximate response rate using
the candidate totals from other survey years. For the survey in Belgium for 2010, the total candidates
surveyed was 1,139 while Germany’s 2005 survey indicates that the total was 2,346. These figures imply
that the respondent rates Belgium in 2007 and Germany in 2009 are about 40%, well above the 20%
threshold. A further discussion of the response rates is in the appendix.
7An additional discussion of response rates is located in the appendix. While we cannot definitively
rule out bias within parties in terms of tendencies to respond, we do not find the response rates by party
to be distributed in a manner that causes concern.
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common space here integrates a number of issues into a main underlying dimension. The
second dimension is most correlated with the question of whether same-sex marriages
should be prohibited. Correlations with each question are shown in Table 5 in the ap-
pendix. While we find some multidimensionality in the ideological common space among
European politicians, the first dimension is dominant relative to the second and other
dimensions, and the second dimension is not much greater than subsequent dimensions
in its importance. We focus on the first dimension for the applications shown below.
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Table 1: Survey Items about Policy Questions in CCS
Question
C2a Immigrants should be required to adjust to the customs of [country].
C2b Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy.
C2c Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment.
C2d Same sex marriages should be prohibited by law.
C2e Women should be given preferential treatment when applying for jobs and promotions.
C2f People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.
C2g Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime goal of government.
C2h Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.
C2i Our democracy needs serious reform.
C2j Immigrants are good for [country’s] economy.
C2k Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.
C2l [Country] should provide military assistance to the “war on terror”.
C2m Torturing a prisoner is never justified even if it might prevent a terrorist attack.
C2n Globalisation should be promoted.
Table 2: Data Structure of the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS)
Country Year Total candidates Respondents (rate) # Usable Observations
Australia 2007 950 472 (49.7%) 458
Austria 2008 4080 966 (23.7%) 954
Belgium 2007 NA 509 (approx. 40%) 505
Denmark 2011 784 375 (47.8%) 294
Finland 2011 2315 911 (39.4%) 902
Germany 2009 NA 789 (approx. 45%) 777
Greece 2007 700 241 (34.4%) 196
Iceland 2009 756 504 (66.7%) 354
Ireland 2007 466 186 (39.9%) 182
Netherlands 2006 489 170 (34.8%) 169
Norway 2009 1972 1015 (51.5%) 1006
Portugal 2011 1150 257 (22.3%) 257
Sweden 2010 4056 1741 (43.0%) 1499
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Figure 1: Party Medians (Estimated 1D) by Country
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3.3 Examining the data: party positions and ideological hetero-
geneity
To describe the data resulting from the scaling, we present several depictions of the
estimates. For each party, we calculate the median value and standard deviation.8 Figure
1 shows the 105 party medians and the country median in the 13 election surveys.9
Some party systems in the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark are rightward and other
systems (Germany, Greece and Portugal) are leftward. Moreover, Figure 2 indicates the
party heterogeneity of the 105 parties and the mean of their standard deviations.
Next we compare parties within and across groupings of “party families”(Von Beyme,
1985; Mair and Mudde, 1998). Members of party families have widely been compared us-
8While the total number of parties is 110, we remove parties whose sample sizes are less than 5, leaving
105 parties.
9Figure 5 in the appendix shows a scatter plot of the first two coordinates of scaled estimates from
the 8,130 individual candidate respondents by country-year.
13
Figure 2: Party SD (Estimated 1D) by Country
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ing mass surveys, expert surveys and manifesto data (Camia and Caramani, 2012; Ennser,
2010). Ideological positions derived from issue scale data, which we present here, provides
a direct measure of the views of the politicians making up these parties, rather than party
campaign presentations or the perceptions of citizens or experts. Figure 3 shows the party
positions of parties grouped by party family. Using the CHES categorization, we place
parties into 7 groups. Note that liberal parties (followed by conservatives) tend to be an
especially ideologically varied party family across countries while green parties (followed
by far left and socialist parties) tend to be much more similar across countries. This is
generally consistent with the expert-based findings of Ennser (2010). However, the elite-
based measure presented here suggests more diversity across countries within the group
of “right parties.”
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Figure 3: Estimated Party Positions Grouped by Party Family
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4 Validity of the Estimates
4.1 Comparison with other measures
We next examine the validity of party policy positions and heterogeneity by comparing
with “left-right” information from three external sources: two expert surveys and mea-
sures derived from party manifestoes. Figure 4 displays the relationship between the party
medians estimated from CCS and left-right party means from the Chapel Hill Expert Sur-
vey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015), the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project
(DALP) expert survey (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013), and the Comparative Manifestos
Project (CMP) (Lehmann et al. 2016). For the CHES, we use the values of party means
for the “Left-Right General” score from the 2010 survey, the year closest to the elite
survey data. Overall, the party medians in the elite survey and the party means of the
expert surveys are strongly correlated at .87 and .89 each. The relationship with the
CMP left-right scores is weaker at .69. A further analysis of the relationship between the
estimates and the full set of CHES issue questions is discussed in the appendix in Table
4.
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Figure 4: The relationship between Estimates and Three Expert Surveys (CHES, DALP,
CMP)
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5 Analysis: Determinants of ideological heterogene-
ity within parties
5.1 Dependent variable
As explained above, an important function of measuring preference heterogeneity is to
understand the correlates of heterogenous preferences, by contrast to heterogeneous be-
havior (Hazan, 2006, 2013; O¨zbudun, 1970). The extant literature on the determinants of
party cohesion highlights three major elements relevant to cross national analysis. One of
these is the incentive electoral institutions provide for members of parties to differentiate
from their party and from one another. Second, parties may be able to more easily recruit
for cohesion because of better control over nomination procedures. Finally, regardless of
the control national parties have over nominations, they may vary in the degree to which
cohesion is valued, as parties prioritizing seeking office over policy may compromise their
policy cohesion.
One of the first major works highlighting the importance of the electoral system, Katz
(1986), famously noted that “intraparty preference voting creates a powerful incentive
to disunity” (p.101) .Carey and Shugart (1995) specified in more detail how intraparty
competition and district magnitude combine to encourage politicians to pursue a personal
vote. While the personal vote literature has long focused on non-ideological implications
such as constituency service (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Heitshusen, Young and
Wood, 2005) and particularism (Ames, 1995; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004), this literature
has also evolved to include the idea that personal vote incentives would reduce policy
cohesion more broadly among parties. Kitschelt and Smyth (2002), for instance, argue
that “party cohesiveness is least likely in multi-member districts that use preferential
votes to choose individual candidates on party lists” (p.1234). Scheiner (2006) suggests
that “where institutions encourage personalistic competition, coherent and complex pro-
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grammatic parties are slow to develop because of the differing, personal agendas of their
members” (p.67). Most empirical literature looks at behavioral phenomena such as leg-
islative voting unity, which is in large part driven by party discipline, rather than party
heterogeneity per se (Carey, 2008; Sieberer, 2006; Depauw and Martin, 2009). However
much of the work in this vein implies that preference cohesion would be reduced by a
personal-vote oriented electoral system, due to encouraging a more diverse party. Still,
evidence with regard to the effects of personal vote incentives on cohesion has been incon-
clusive at best, particularly given the use of indirect behavioral measures of party unity,
such as roll call voting (Owens, 2003) which results from many different sources (Carey,
2008). Here, we are able to test whether party heterogeneity is related to electoral sys-
tems encouraging intraparty competition—the ability to vote for candidates of the same
party—and district magnitude. We thus hypothesize that:
H1. Intraparty competition increases party heterogeneity
An important caveat here is that, as Carey and Shugart (1995) explain, district magni-
tude (the number of seats in districts) also influences personal vote incentives. Specifically,
higher district magnitudes should increase personalization when intraparty competition
is present and decrease personalization when it is not present. Thus, while in general
we might have imagined that smaller district magnitudes to increase heterogeneity, this
argument suggests we should expect this only in cases without intraparty competition.
Meanwhile, district magnitude may otherwise decrease heterogeneity.
H2a. District magnitude increases party heterogeneity when intraparty competition is
present
H2b. District magnitude decreases party heterogeneity when intraparty competition is
not present
Electoral systems can only play a limited role in generating party heterogeneity because
party nomination practices can produce parties that have recruited cohesively, regardless
of specific electoral rules (Bowler et al., 1999). Since the work of Schattschneider (1942),
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scholars have noted the importance of party control over the selection and nomination
of candidates for office where centralized control is expected to enable parties to recruit
to ensure a cohesive membership (Gallagher and Marsh, 1987; Katz and Mair, 1992;
Hazan, 2003; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Cross and Katz, 2013; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). As
Pennings and Hazan (2001) note, “the cohesion of the party is closely related to the locus of
selection” (p. 271). Carey (2008) notes that centralized control over nominations allows
party leaders to“screen potential candidates for ideological compatibility with national
party priorities, and so to foster cohesiveness among those ultimately elected” (p. 127).
With a centralized process, parties can ensure that members adhere to the policy positions
of the party before deciding on a nomination (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2010; Faas, 2003;
Hix, 2004). Without centralized control over nominations, members with preferences
diverging from the national leadership may become candidates, leading to greater diversity
in views among candidates (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007; Kristja´nsson, 1998)
H3. Centralized candidate nomination process will reduce party heterogeneity
A third key factor that would regulate whether parties would attract and recruit
a cohesive membership are the goals of the party. Kitschelt (2000) notes that many
parties will simply not be programmatic in their goals. Although few parties in this
sample engage in linkages that could be called clientelistic, certainly many are more office
seeking than policy-seeking. Strøm (1990) notes that parties may greatly sacrifice coherent
policy goals in order to seek office, which creates incentives to recruit heterogeneous
members and encourages a broad array of members to join (Hansen and Rasmussen,
2013). Meanwhile, more policy-seeking parties are relatively more likely to emphasize
a consistent policy position among members in order to facilitate programmatic goals
(Pedersen, 2012). Parties that emphasize maintaining clear policy positions will enhance
ideological homogeneity through self-selection (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2010). In turn,
parties with greater emphasis on ideological positioning in their goals will be less likely
to attract candidates with divergent preferences.
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H4. Parties emphasizing policy positions will be associated with less party heterogeneity
In addition, extant literature suggests we should control for two basic features of par-
ties, size and ideology. A larger party is more likely to be heterogeneous because, (Sieberer
2006:154), “especially large parties representing more than one social group have incen-
tives to diversify their offer, thus accepting a certain degree of preference heterogeneity
among candidates.” Meanwhile, it is often thought that parties on a certain side of
the political spectrum may be more or less heterogeneous, with left-wing parties being
particularly associated with homogeneity (e.g. Ennser 2010)
5.2 Measures
To operationalize party heterogeneity—policy preference diversity among party membership—
we simply calculate the standard deviation of the main dimension of the scaled elite survey
data.
To capture intraparty competition we create a dummy variable assigning 1 to the four
countries in which the ability of individual candidates to win seats can be influenced by
their personal votes: Greece, Finland, Ireland, and Denmark.10
We also consider the effect of district magnitude, measured as the log-transformed
median value for each country, which is expected to increase personalization on average
as the number of seats in districts decreases when intraparty competition is not present
and Increase otherwise. This measure comes from Carey and Hix (2011).
To measure party nomination processes and the types of competition the party engages
in we make use of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) 2008-9
Dataset 11. We match the parties in the CCS data (above-mentioned 105 parties in 13
10These cases make use of either open-list PR or STV. Our coding of the presence of intraparty
competition for this sample is based on Katz (1986). This coding is also consistent with the recent work
of Valdini (2006, 2013) and Ortega Villodes (2006).
11http://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/
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country years) to the parties in DALP. 12 To measure the locus of nomination power
we used a party level variable National Candidate Selection Power which captures the
nomination influence of national party leaders relative to regional and local nomination
influence.
We also make use of DALP to capture the degree of policy orientation of party appeals
to voters. The question Policy Positions captures experts’ perceptions on the degree to
which parties focus on their policy positions.13
Finally, we also include measures of party size (Party Vote Share) and expert survey
locations of left-right ideology from the DALP data set.
5.3 Results
We make use of a multi-level linear regression including country-year random effects. Ta-
ble 3 shows the results of this analysis in model 1. First, we find no overall effect of
intraparty competition in the full sample. However, we find several effects of party or-
ganizational factors here. First, National Candidate Selection is associated with higher
party ideological heterogeneity. Second, we find that Party Policy Emphasis is negatively
related with party ideological heterogeneity, as we expect. Parties known for program-
matic messaging tend to be less ideologically heterogeneous—that is, more cohesive. No
effects are found for either left-right position or party size.
In order to investigate the effects of district magnitude more closely, in models 2 and 3,
we examine a subsample of countries with intraparty competition encouraged by electoral
rules and a sample of those without. While these subsamples are small, they do allow us
to determine if there is any tendency for the effect of district magnitude to exist. Here, we
12As we discuses above, we estimate the values of party heterogeneity of 110 parties in 13 country
years. Since some parties and data in Iceland are not available in DALP, 78 parties in 12 country years
are matched. Thus, we analyze these 78 observations in the following.
13“Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the
attractiveness of the party’s positions on policy issues.”
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find that indeed the effect of district magnitude is present and negative when no intraparty
competition exists. However, it is positive (encouraging heterogeneity) when intraparty
competition is present. Thus while we find no evidence of a difference in heterogeneity on
average due to intraparty competition, we find some evidence for the mediating effect of
such electoral systems on district magnitude.14 We also note that the findings regarding
national candidate selection and party policy emphasis Are present in the sample without
intraparty competition. Moreover, there is an effect of left-right position within this
subsample–with ’rightist’ parties tending to be more cohesive.
14The effect of district magnitude with and without intraparty competition is also statistically signifi-
cant when tested as an interaction term
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Table 3: Determinants of Party Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
All Cases No Intraparty Intraparty
Competition Competition
Log District Magnitude -.123 -.262∗ 1.155∗∗∗
(.135) (.103) (.338)
Intraparty Competition -.247
(.315)
National Candidate Selection -.864∗∗ -.676∗ -1.575+
(.318) (.296) (.892)
Party Policy Emphasis -1.216∗∗ -1.302∗∗ -.763
(.397) (.406) (.795)
Left-Right Expert Position -.041 -.113∗ .100
(.047) (.050) (.088)
Party Vote Share -.013 -.017+ .013
(.010) (.010) (.019)
Constant 14.096∗∗∗ 15.082∗∗∗ 8.528∗∗
(1.650) (1.675) (3.302)
Observations 78 55 23
log(likelihood) -105.731 -66.683 -28.143
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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6 Discussion
This paper examines how we can measure and compare party elite ideological positions and
heterogeneity using the latent information extracted by joint scaling issue questions in elite
surveys. We propose a method to measure a dimension of ideological information useful
for analyzing party politics, yet not accounted for in existing measures of party positions.
This method focuses on the information derived from surveys of party candidates, as
opposed to voter perceptions, political communications or the general reputation in the
eyes of experts. Second, while the most commonly used methods provide only estimates
party overall positions, this method accounts for the internal variance of the positions
of elites within parties, a source of great interest in comparative politics. Using data
from Europe, we show that the values of party median positions derived from scaling elite
survey questions provide meaningful information and are comparable to those derived
from elite surveys and party manifestoes, which demonstrates the face validity of this
measure.
To demonstrate the utility of these data, we examine the determinants of party het-
erogeneity using the intraparty variance of our measure. In this analysis we test whether
electoral systems and party organizational factors affect candidate ideological heterogene-
ity. First, we find that merely having an electoral system that encourages intraparty
competition does not have an impact on party ideological heterogeneity. This suggests
that findings related to party unity are probably due to the effects of intraparty compe-
tition on how party discipline is enforced, rather than the diversity of parties—at least in
the parliamentary regimes examined here. However, we also find that district magnitude
correlates with heterogeneity in a manner consistent with the arguments of Carey and
Shugart (1995): in countries without intraparty competition, lower district magnitudes
increase heterogeneity, as we would expect due to the localizing impact of smaller dis-
tricts. In countries with intraparty competition, meanwhile, the relationship is positive:
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larger districts produce more heterogeneity. In addition, we find that parties that control
their candidate selection mechanisms primarily at the national level tend to produce less
heterogeneous parties. This suggests that local influence in the nomination process in-
deed increases the tendency for more diverse preferences and parties. Finally, parties that
prioritize their policy positions tend to recruit a more homogeneous pool of candidates.
We interpret this finding to suggest that more office seeking parties, who are not known
for emphasizing policy positions, encourage a diverse set of members to join the party.
We suggest that using the latent positions derived from elite surveys is a promising
approach to measuring party positions and capturing intraparty politics. Subject to the
limitation that only a one year of information is currently available for each country,
future work should consider using such estimates as potentially useful measures of the
preferences of parties at the elite level and their heterogeneity.
26
References
Alema´n, Eduardo, Ernesto Calvo, Mark P Jones and Noah Kaplan. 2009. “Comparing
Cosponsorship and Roll-Call Ideal Points.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34(1):87–116.
Ames, Barry. 1995. “Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation.”
American Journal of Political Science 39(2):406–433. ArticleType: research-article
/ Full publication date: May, 1995 / Copyright c© 1995 Midwest Political Science
Association.
Andeweg, Rudy B and Jacques Thomassen. 2010. “Pathways to party unity: Sanctions,
loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament.” Party Politics
p. 1354068810377188.
Andre´, Audrey, Sam Depauw and Shane Martin. 2014. “Electoral Systems and Legisla-
tors’ Constituency Effort The Mediating Effect of Electoral Vulnerability.” Comparative
Political Studies p. 0010414014545512.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M Snyder Jr and Charles Stewart III. 2001. “The effects
of party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
pp. 533–572.
Armstrong, David A, Ryan Bakker, Royce Carroll, Christopher Hare, Keith T Poole,
Howard Rosenthal et al. 2014. Analyzing Spatial Models of Choice and Judgment with
R. CRC Press.
Ba¨ck, Hanna. 2008. “Intra-party politics and coalition formation: Evidence from Swedish
local government.” Party Politics 14(1):71–89.
Ba¨ck, Hanna and Marc Debus. 2016. Political Parties, Parliaments and Legislative Speech-
making. Springer.
Ba¨ck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller. 2016. “Intra-party diversity and
ministerial selection in coalition governments.” Public Choice 166:355–378.
Bailer, Stefanie. 2014. “Interviews and Surveys in Legislative Research.” The Oxford
Handbook of Legislative Studies p. 167.
Bakker, Ryan, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary
Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen and Milada Anna Vachudova.
2015. “Measuring party positions in Europe The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file,
1999–2010.” Party Politics 21(1):143–152.
Bakker, Ryan, Erica Edwards, Seth Jolly, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny and Marco Steenber-
gen. 2014. “Anchoring the experts: Using vignettes to compare party ideology across
countries.” Research & Politics 1(3):2053168014553502.
27
Bakker, Ryan, Seth Jolly and Jonathan Polk. 2012. “Complexity in the European party
space: Exploring dimensionality with experts.” European Union Politics 13(2):219–245.
Bakker, Ryan, Seth Jolly, Jonathan Polk and Keith Poole. 2014. “The European Com-
mon Space: Extending the Use of Anchoring Vignettes.” The Journal of Politics
76(04):1089–1101.
Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver. 2007. “Estimating party policy positions: Comparing
expert surveys and hand-coded content analysis.” Electoral Studies 26(1):90–107.
Blais, Andre´ and Marc Andre´ Bodet. 2006. “Does proportional representation foster
closer congruence between citizens and policy makers?” Comparative Political Studies
39(10):1243–1262.
Bowler, Shaun, David M Farrell, Richard S Katz et al. 1999. Party discipline and parlia-
mentary government. The Ohio State University Press.
Budge, Ian. 2000. “Expert judgements of party policy positions: Uses and limitations in
political research.” European Journal of Political Research 37(1):103–113.
Budge, Ian. 2001. Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and gov-
ernments, 1945-1998. Vol. 1 Oxford University Press.
Budge, Ian, David Robertson and Derek Hearl. 1987. Ideology, strategy and party change:
spatial analyses of post-war election programmes in 19 democracies. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Budge, Ian and Michael D McDonald. 2007. “Election and party system effects on pol-
icy representation: Bringing time into a comparative perspective.” Electoral Studies
26(1):168–179.
Cain, Bruce E, John A Ferejohn and Morris P Fiorina. 1987. “The personal vote: Con-
stituency service and electoral independence.”.
Camia, Valeria and Daniele Caramani. 2012. “Family meetings: Ideological conver-
gence within party families across Europe, 1945–2009.” Comparative European Politics
10(1):48–85.
Carey, John M. 2008. Legislative voting and accountability. Cambridge University Press.
Carey, John M and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to cultivate a personal
vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas.” Electoral studies 14(4):417–439.
Carey, John M. and Simon Hix. 2011. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Pro-
portional Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 55(2):383–397.
Carroll, Royce and Keith Poole. 2014. “Roll call analysis and the study of legislatures.”
The Oxford handbook of legislative studies pp. 103–124.
28
Carrubba, Clifford J, Matthew Gabel, Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth Mont-
gomery and Rebecca Schambach. 2006. “Off the record: unrecorded legislative votes, se-
lection bias and roll-call vote analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 36(04):691–
704.
Carrubba, Clifford, Matthew Gabel and Simon Hug. 2008. “Legislative voting behavior,
seen and unseen: A theory of roll-call vote selection.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
33(4):543–572.
Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman and Douglas Rivers. 2004. “The statistical analysis of
roll call data.” American Political Science Review 98(02):355–370.
Coleman Battista, James and Jesse T Richman. 2011. “Party pressure in the US state
legislatures.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 36(3):397–422.
Cross, William P and Richard S Katz. 2013. The challenges of intra-party democracy.
Oxford University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. 2008. “The quantity and the quality of party systems party system
polarization, its measurement, and its consequences.” Comparative Political Studies
41(7):899–920.
Depauw, Sam. 1999. “Parliamentary Party Cohesion and the Searcity of Sanctions in the
Belgian Chamber of Representatives.” Res Publica: Tijdschrift voor Politologie 1:15–39.
Depauw, Sam and Shane Martin. 2009. “Legislative party discipline and cohesion in
comparative perspective.” Intra-party politics and coalition governments pp. 103–120.
Deschouwer, Kris and Sam Depauw. 2014. Representing the people: a survey among
members of statewide and substate parliaments. OUP Oxford.
Desposato, Scott W. 2005. “Correcting for small group inflation of roll-call cohesion
scores.” British Journal of Political Science 35(4):731.
Desposato, Scott W. 2006. “The impact of electoral rules on legislative parties: Lessons
from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies.” Journal of Politics 68(4):1018–
1030.
Dow, Jay K. 2001. “A comparative spatial analysis of majoritarian and proportional
elections.” Electoral Studies 20(1):109–125.
Dow, Jay K. 2011. “Party-system extremism in majoritarian and proportional electoral
systems.” British Journal of Political Science 41(02):341–361.
Ennser, Laurenz. 2010. “The homogeneity of West European party families: The radical
right in comparative perspective.” Party Politics p. 1354068810382936.
29
Ezrow, Lawrence. 2008. “Parties’ policy programmes and the dog that didn’t bark: No
evidence that proportional systems promote extreme party positioning.” British Journal
of Political Science 38(3):479.
Faas, Thorsten. 2003. “To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group
pressures on MEPs and their consequences for party group cohesion in the European
Parliament.” European Journal of Political Research 42(6):841–866.
Gallagher, Michael and Michael Marsh. 1987. Candidate selection in comparative perspec-
tive. Sage Newbury Park, CA.
Giannetti, Daniela and Kenneth Benoit. 2008. Intra-party politics and coalition govern-
ments. Routledge.
Hallerberg, Mark and Patrik Marier. 2004. “Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and
Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries.” American Journal of
Political Science 48(3):571–587. ArticleType: primary article / Full publication date:
Jul., 2004 / Copyright c© 2004 Midwest Political Science Association.
Hansen, Martin Ejnar and Niels Erik Kaaber Rasmussen. 2013. “Does Running for the
Same Party Imply Similar Policy Preferences? Evidence from Voting Advice Applica-
tions.” Representation 49(2):189–205.
Hazan, Reuven Y. 2003. “Introduction: Does cohesion equal discipline? towards a con-
ceptual delineation.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 9(4):1–11.
Hazan, Reuven Y. 2006. Cohesion and discipline in legislatures. Routledge.
Hazan, Reuven Y. 2013. Cohesion and discipline in legislatures. Routledge.
Hazan, Reuven Y and Gideon Rahat. 2010. Democracy within parties: candidate selection
methods and their political consequences. Oxford University Press.
Heitshusen, Valerie, Garry Young and David M. Wood. 2005. “Electoral Context and
MP Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom.” American Journal of Political Science 49(1):32–45.
Hix, Simon. 2004. “Electoral institutions and legislative behavior: Explaining voting
defection in the European Parliament.” World politics 56(02):194–223.
Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary
Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen and Milada Vachudova. 2010. “Reliability and
validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning.” European
Journal of Political Research 49(5):687–703.
Huber, John and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. “Expert interpretations of party space and
party locations in 42 societies.” Party politics 1(1):73–111.
30
Jahn, Detlef and Christoph Oberst. 2012. “Ideological Party Cohesion in Macro-
comparative Politics: The Nordic Social Democratic Parties from a Comparative Per-
spective.” Scandinavian Political Studies 35(3):222–245.
Kam, Christopher. 2001. “Do ideological preferences explain parliamentary behaviour?
Evidence from Great Britain and Canada.” Journal of Legislative Studies 7(4):89–126.
Kam, Christopher, William T Bianco, Itai Sened and Regina Smyth. 2010. “Ministerial
selection and intraparty organization in the contemporary British parliament.” Amer-
ican Political Science Review 104(2):289–306.
Katz, Richard. 1986. Intraparty preference voting. In Electoral laws and their political
consequences. Agathon Press New York pp. 85–103.
Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1992. Party organization: A data handbook. London:
Sage.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. “Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic poli-
ties.” Comparative political studies 33(6-7):845–879.
Kitschelt, Herbert and Daniel M Kselman. 2013. “Economic development, democratic
experience, and political parties’ linkage strategies.” Comparative political studies
46(11):1453–1484.
Kitschelt, Herbert and Regina Smyth. 2002. “Programmatic Party Cohesion in Emerging
Postcommunist Democracies Russia in Comparative Context.” Comparative Political
Studies 35(10):1228–1256.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, Michael D McDonald
et al. 2006. Mapping policy preferences II: estimates for parties, electors, and govern-
ments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003. Oxford University
Press Oxford.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard I Hofferbert and Ian Budge. 1994. Parties, policies,
and democracy. Westview Press.
Ko¨nig, Thomas, Moritz Marbach and Moritz Osnabru¨gge. 2013. “Estimating Party Po-
sitions across Countries and Time—A Dynamic Latent Variable Model for Manifesto
Data.” Political Analysis 21(4):468–491.
Kristja´nsson, Svanur. 1998. “Electoral politics and governance: Transformation of the
party system in Iceland, 1970–96.” Comparing party system change. London: Routledge
pp. 167–182.
Laver, Michael. 2014. “Measuring policy positions in political space.” Annual Review of
Political Science 17(1).
31
Laver, Michael and Kenneth A Shepsle. 1990. “Government coalitions and intraparty
politics.” British Journal of Political Science 20(04):489–507.
Laver, Michael and Kenneth Benoit. 2006. “Party Policy in Modern Democracies.” London
(Internet Final Version 28.11 .
Laver, Michael and W Ben Hunt. 1992. Policy and party competition. Routledge.
Lo, James, Sven-Oliver Proksch and Thomas Gschwend. 2014. “A common left-right scale
for voters and parties in Europe.” Political Analysis 22(2):205–223.
Mair, Peter and Cas Mudde. 1998. “The party family and its study.” Annual Review of
Political Science 1(1):211–229.
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Marco R Steenbergen and Ryan Bakker. 2007. “Crossvali-
dating data on party positioning on European integration.” Electoral Studies 26(1):23–
38.
McGann, Anthony J. 2002. “The advantages of ideological cohesion a model of con-
stituency representation and electoral competition in multi-party democracies.” Journal
of Theoretical Politics 14(1):37–70.
Mikhaylov, Slava, Michael Laver and Kenneth R Benoit. 2012. “Coder reliability and
misclassification in the human coding of party manifestos.” Political Analysis 20(1):78–
91.
Morgenstern, Scott. 2003. Patterns of legislative politics: Roll-call voting in Latin America
and the United States. Cambridge University Press.
Ortega Villodes, Carmen. 2006. Preference voting systems and their impact on the per-
sonalisation of politics. In Comparative studies of electoral systems meeting (CSES),
Sevilla, Spain.
Owens, John E. 2003. “Part 1: Cohesion: Explaining party cohesion and discipline
in democratic legislatures: Purposiveness and contexts.” The Journal of Legislative
Studies 9(4):12–40.
O¨zbudun, Ergun. 1970. Party cohesion in Western democracies: A causal analysis. Sage.
Pedersen, Helene Helboe. 2012. “Policy-seeking parties in multiparty systems: Influence
or purity?” Party Politics 18(3):297–314.
Pennings, Paul and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2001. “Democratizing candidate selection: causes
and consequences.” Party Politics 7(3):267–275.
Poole, Keith, Howard Rosenthal, James Lo, Royce Carroll and Maintainer James Lo.
2013. “Package ‘basicspace’.”.
32
Poole, Keith, Jeffrey Lewis, Howard Rosenthal, James Lo and Royce Carroll. 2015. “Re-
covering a Basic Space from Issue Scales in R.” Journal of Statistical Software (forth-
coming) .
Poole, Keith T. 1998. “Recovering a basic space from a set of issue scales.” American
Journal of Political Science pp. 954–993.
Poole, Keith T. 2005. Spatial models of parliamentary voting. Cambridge University
Press.
Poole, Keith T and Howard L Rosenthal. 2011. Ideology and congress. Vol. 1 Transaction
Publishers.
Poole, Keith T and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A political-economic history of
roll call voting. Oxford University Press.
Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Jonathan B Slapin. 2014. The Politics of Parliamentary Debate.
Cambridge University Press.
Rahat, Gideon and Reuven Y Hazan. 2001. “Candidate selection methods an analytical
framework.” Party Politics 7(3):297–322.
Rahat, Gideon and Tamir Sheafer. 2007. “The personalization (s) of politics: Israel,
1949–2003.” Political Communication 24(1):65–80.
Rovny, Jan. 2012. “Who emphasizes and who blurs? Party strategies in multidimensional
competition.” European Union Politics 13(2):269–292.
Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2009. “Recovering a basic space from elite surveys: Evidence from
Latin America.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34(1):117–145.
Saiegh, Sebastia´n M. 2015. “Using Joint Scaling Methods to Study Ideology and Repre-
sentation: Evidence from Latin America.” Political Analysis p. mpv008.
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1942. Party Government: American Government in Action.
Transaction Publishers.
Scheiner, Ethan. 2006. Democracy without competition in Japan: Opposition failure in a
one-party dominant state. Cambridge University Press.
Scully, Roger, Simon Hix and David M Farrell. 2012. “National or European Parliamen-
tarians? Evidence from a New Survey of the Members of the European Parliament*.”
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50(4):670–683.
Sieberer, Ulrich. 2006. “Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative anal-
ysis.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 12(2):150–178.
Slapin, Jonathan B and Sven-Oliver Proksch. 2008. “A scaling model for estimating time-
series party positions from texts.” American Journal of Political Science 52(3):705–722.
33
Spirling, Arthur and Iain McLean. 2007. “UK OC OK? Interpreting optimal classification
scores for the UK House of Commons.” Political Analysis 15(1):85–96.
Strøm, Kaare. 1990. “A behavioral theory of competitive political parties.” American
Journal of Political Science pp. 565–598.
Valdini, Melody Ellis. 2006. Electoral institutions and information shortcuts: the effect
of decisive intraparty competition on the behavior of voters and party elites. ProQuest.
Valdini, Melody Ellis. 2013. “Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias: The
Effect of the Personal Vote on the Representation of Women.” Politics &amp; Gender
9(01):76–92.
Volkens, Andrea. 2007. “Strengths and weaknesses of approaches to measuring policy
positions of parties.” Electoral Studies 26(1):108–120.
Volkens, Andrea, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, Michael D McDonald and Hans-Dieter Klinge-
mann. 2013. Mapping policy preferences from texts: statistical solutions for manifesto
analysts. Vol. 3 Oxford University Press.
Von Beyme, Klaus. 1985. Political parties in Western democracies. Gower Publishing
Company, Limited.
Wiesehomeier, Nina and Kenneth Benoit. 2009. “Presidents, parties, and policy compe-
tition.” The Journal of Politics 71(04):1435–1447.
Zittel, Thomas and Thomas Gschwend. 2008. “Individualised constituency campaigns
in mixed-member electoral systems: Candidates in the 2005 German elections.” West
European Politics 31(5):978–1003.
34
A Appendix
A.1 Appendix: Questions used from DALP survey
Party nomination control: The DALP survey question producing this variable is as
follows:
More generally, the power to select candidates in national legislative elections
is always divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level
party organizations, and national party leaders. Often one particular level
of party organization dominates the selection process, while in other places
candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels
of party organization. Which of the following four options best describes the
following parties’ balance of power in selecting candidates for national leg-
islative elections? [1] National party leaders control the process of candidate
selections , [2] Regional/state-level party organizations control the process of
candidate selections,[3] Local/municipal actors control the process of candi-
date selections, [4] Selection is the outcome of bargaining between different
levels
This variable is originally constructed as ordinal using a continuous average across experts.
We convert this variable into a dichotomy based on the original expert-level data. To do
this, we simply assign 1 to parties where a majority for experts indicated a national party
nomination system and 0 to parties in which most experts indicated a mostly subnational
nomination process. In several cases the experts were evenly split between these and to
these we assigned the 0 category. We also examined the results in which these cases were
assigned the category of 0 and find results similar to those presented in the table. Our
results in table 3 are also similar using the original ordinal variable directly from the
individual-level DALP data set. However, we believe that the rank ordering of category
35
4 cannot be easily averaged with categories 1-3.
Party Emphasis on Policy Positions: The DALP question producing this variable
is as follows:
Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support
by emphasizing the attractiveness of the partys positions on policy issues. [1]
Not at all, [2] To a small extent [3] To a moderate extent [4] To a great extent
These results are averaged across the experts to produce a continuous variable released
as part of the individual-level DALP data set.
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Figure 5: Scaled Coordinates by Country (CCS)
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A.2 Estimated response rate bias by party: comparisons with
party family and ideology
As noted above, the response rate can pose a potential problem for generating representa-
tive statistics from the CCS questions. Although we find promising predictability among
the first dimension coordinates in terms of overall left-right placements for parties, here we
evaluate more closely whether the response rates may have distorted the positions of in-
dividual parties. To do this, we calculate an estimated response rate per party by looking
at the difference between the proportion of responses and the most proximate vote share
for that party. We then subtract this quantity from the vote chair in order to determine
the gap between the expected and actual proportion of responses. If a party appears to
have an unusual response rate on this metric, it may also be distorted in terms of how the
party overall is positioned. In the figures 6 and 7 below we plot this metric against, first,
the party family and, second, the quartiles of the ideological spectrum, based on expert
judgements from the CHES data used above. First, we note that 76 percent of parties in
our data have gaps between actual and expected responses below 10 percent. In general,
this gap is relatively small and has no apparent relationship with any party type. Our
interpretation is that no party type stands out as being particularly unusual with regard
to response rates.
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Figure 6: Response rate-vote share gap, by party family
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Figure 7: Response rate-vote share gap, by ideology quartile
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A.3 Appendix: Additional tables on substantive interpretation
of the estimates
Table 4: Correlations between Estimated Elite Ideology and CHES policy questions
1st Dim. Ideal Points 2nd Dim. Ideal Points
LR General 0.8857 0.0516
LR Econ 0.8361 0.1933
GAL-TAN 0.7236 -0.2614
Spend v. Tax 0.8347 0.1550
Deregulation 0.7929 0.2817
Redistribution 0.8215 0.2548
Civ-lib/Law-Order 0.8195 -0.0938
Social/Lifestyle 0.6386 -0.3715
Religious Principle 0.5701 -0.3459
Immigration 0.7651 -0.1540
Multiculturalism 0.7860 -0.2581
Urban-Rural 0.4040 -0.2165
Environment 0.7861 -0.0552
Regions 0.1393 0.0952
International Security -0.6983 -0.3735
Ethnic Minorities 0.7895 -0.1841
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Table 5: Correlation of Scaled Estimates with Individual Policy Questions in CCS
CCS Question Code 1st Dim Ideal Points 2nd Dimension Ideal Points
C2a -0.64 0.26
C2b -0.50 -0.11
C2c 0.55 0.04
C2d -0.42 0.76
C2e 0.52 0.15
C2f -0.58 0.31
C2g 0.48 0.19
C2h 0.74 0.29
C2i 0.27 0.30
C2j 0.44 -0.35
C2k 0.44 -0.40
C2l -0.71 -0.20
C2m 0.42 -0.25
C2n -0.22 -0.53
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